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ABSTRACT 
 Classical mathematics is a form of mathematics that has a large range of 
application; however, its application has boundaries.  In this paper, I show that Sperber 
and Wilson’s concept of relevance can demarcate classical mathematics’ range of 
applicability by demarcating classical logic’s range of applicability.  Furthermore, I 
introduce how to systematize Sperber and Wilson’s concept of relevance into a quasi-
classical logic that can explain classical logic’s and classical mathematics’ range of 
applicability.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Classical mathematics is the most robust and commonly used form of 
mathematics.  It is the kind of mathematics that economist use to calculate a country’s 
GDP.  It is the kind of mathematics manufacturers use to produce cars.  It is the kind of 
mathematics that engineers use to build spaceships.  Not only can experts rely on 
classical mathematics as a deductive tool, but they can also apply it to a greater range of 
mathematical problems than any competing form of mathematics. As a system, classical 
mathematics has axioms.  Axioms are basic rules that, when combined with rules of 
inference, govern the way a system operates and reaches conclusions.  Classical 
mathematicians attempt to discover and prove the conclusions that follow from the 
axioms of classical mathematics. 
 Each system of mathematics uses a system of logic.  Classical mathematics uses 
classical logic.  The role of the logic that a form of mathematics uses is to provide some 
of the basic principles that govern the operation of the mathematics.  The logic is also 
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able to explain mathematics by allowing the construction of proofs about objects and 
properties of mathematics. This makes the relation between a mathematics system and its 
logic intimate – the logic allows us to see into the mathematics. 
 However, despite the seemingly unshakable nature of classical mathematics its 
acceptability is questionable. Alternative programs, such as the one developed by the 
intuitionists, compete with classical mathematics.  Some of these competing schools arise 
from disagreement over which axioms are acceptable.  The law of excluded middle 
(LEM) is one of those controversial axioms. Below is the schema of the law, followed by 
its traditional interpretation. 
 
p v ¬p 
 
This schema expresses that the proposition, p, is true or its negation is true. For instance, 
either Mercury is geologically active or it is not the case that Mercury is geologically 
active. The structure of LEM applies, or at least is supposed to apply, to any meaningful 
sentence.  Here is a non-traditional interpretation of LEM that includes the schema’s 
universal application to sentences: for all x (where x can be any sentence), either x is true 
or it is not the case that x is true.    
 There are differing reasons for rejecting LEM. The constructivists, who do not 
consider LEM to be an axiom, require a proof of LEM in order for it to be true. However, 
they cannot derive LEM for all possible cases.  The finitude of human experience does 
not allow the construction of the infinite number of derivations necessary to prove that 
LEM holds.  Others simply do not find the axiom to be self-evident.  The restriction to 
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the two options that LEM expresses does not seem to be obvious.  The possibility of a 
third option or infinitely many options remains.  Kurt Gödel famously claimed, “the 
axioms force themselves upon us as being true” (Gödel, 484). Those who question the 
self-evidence of LEM do not find the dilemma that it expresses to force itself upon us. 
What I consider the best reasons for rejecting LEM are counterexamples of the following 
kind.   
 
(1) Either an A musical note is green or it is not the case that an A musical note is 
green. 
  
(2) Either the purpose of human life is to be happy or it is not the case that the 
purpose of human life is to be happy.  
 
(3) Either the largest natural number is even or it is not the case that the largest 
natural number is even.  
 
(4) Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or it is not the case that there will be 
a sea battle tomorrow. 
 
The counterexamples are cases of LEM.  If LEM is correct, then the disjunction must be 
true in all cases.  Any case of LEM that is false or appears to be confused qualifies as a 
counterexample to LEM.  
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 Sentences (1), (2), (3), and (4) present cases of LEM where the predicates 
employed in the embedded sentences have an unusual relation to the subjects of those 
sentences.  In sentence (1), it is not clear how a sound could satisfy (bear the feature of) 
having or not having a color.  The concept of sound and the concept of color have no 
overlap; the concept of greenness cannot combine with the concept of sound into a 
complex concept.  This makes the attribution of color to sound a category mistake.  A 
category mistake is attributing a property to a thing that cannot possibly have that 
property.  For instance, to claim that this paper is anxious would be a category mistake.  
Talking about the anxiousness of this paper does not make sense because this paper is 
inanimate.  In a similar manner, a sound cannot possibly have a color.  It is nonsensical to 
associate color and sound together, at least in any way that is stronger than correlation.  
In other words, color is irrelevant to sound.  The result is that the sentence ‘an A musical 
note is green’ is nonsense or meaningless.   
 To be fair, the defenders of LEM would not accept sentence (1) to be a genuine 
case of LEM.  In order for a sentence to be an instance of LEM, the sentences must be 
meaningful.  Since sentence (1) is not meaningful (by category mistake), sentence (1) is 
not a real case of LEM.   Consequently, this example is not a genuine counterexample. 
The defenders of LEM are able to cherry pick away these kinds of cases by setting the 
standard that sentences must be meaningful.  This is a fair move. There are good reasons 
to reject the use of meaningless sentences into the LEM schema.  
 For sentence (2), assume that natural processes are entirely responsible for the rise 
of humans, and that entities have purpose only if an intelligent being gives purpose to 
those entities when creating them.  The purpose of a kitchen knife, for instance, is to cut.   
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However, a rock does not have purpose because its coming to existence does not include 
an intelligent being giving it purpose. Humans, like rocks, are a product of an unguided 
natural process. Humans came to exist without an intelligent being giving them purpose. 
On this view, human life does not have purpose.  However, the disjunction in sentence 
(2) presupposes that human life has purpose.   The problem is that, according to our 
background assumption, this presupposition is false.  Human life does not have purpose 
(according to the earlier stipulations).  The presupposition being false creates a problem 
for this case of LEM because both disjuncts rely on the presupposition.  Each disjunct is 
attributing features to the purpose of human life, but that attribution would only make 
sense if human life really had purpose.  Since the presupposition is false, the disjunction 
appears mistaken.  The assumption that human life has purpose acts as a foundation for 
the disjuncts that allows the disjunction to make sense.  Without the foundation (because 
it is a false assumption), there is no warrant to assert the disjunction.  
 Sentence (3) is another instance of LEM that, like sentence (2), has presupposition 
failure. In this case, the sentence presupposes that there is a largest natural number.  Since 
the natural numbers go on infinitely, there cannot be a largest natural number.  Thus, 
sentence (3) is asserting a predicate about an object that does not exist.  The 
presupposition is false and each disjunct relies on the presupposition.  Consequently, the 
assertion of the disjunction is mistaken.  
 The defenders of LEM may argue that this is a mistaken interpretation of the 
sentence.  In fact, sentence (3) says that either there exists a largest natural number and 
that number is even or it is not the case that there exists a largest natural number and that 
number is even. On this interpretation, there is no presupposition.  This may be a result of 
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a divergence in intuitions of what the sentence means, but apply this interpretation to the 
following sentence: ‘Zeus is a god or it is not the case that Zeus is a god’.  The allies of 
LEM can interpret this sentence in two ways. (1) Either Zeus exists and he is a god or it is 
not the case that Zeus exists and he is a god. (2) Either Zeus exists in Greek mythology 
and he is a god or it is not the case that Zeus exists in Greek mythology and he is a god.  
It is not clear which interpretation is correct.  The former follows the structure that the 
allies of LEM use for sentence (3), but discussion about Zeus is typically in the context of 
Greek mythology. The allies of LEM cannot definitively select one of the interpretations 
because the metaphysical status of Zeus is not in the content of the sentence ‘Zeus is a 
god or it is not the case that Zeus is a god’.  The status of Zeus is a presupposition and the 
presupposition may vary from context to context.  Without any context, the 
presupposition is an abstraction and not in the content of the sentence.   Similarly, 
whether a largest natural number exists is not in the content of sentence (3) – the sentence 
is not considering whether a largest natural number exists. The sentence is simply 
considering whether the largest natural number is even or not.  The existence of a largest 
natural number is the concern of some investigation before the assertion of sentence (3). 
 For sentence (4), assume that the future is undecided.  Consequently, all claims 
about the future lack truth-value.   The disjuncts in sentence (4) are claims about the 
future and, therefore, lack truth-value.  With these metaphysical obligations about fate 
and time, sentence (4) no longer appears to be an appropriate case of LEM.   In order for 
sentence (4) to hold at least one of the disjuncts must be true, however, neither disjunct is 
true.   This means, not surprisingly, that sentence (4) also lacks a truth-value and fails to 
be true.  Therefore, on this assumption, sentence (4) is also a counterexample to LEM. 
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 The rules of deductive logic have a high standard to meet – they should not have 
any counterexamples. This means that when there is a counterexample, then there are 
grounds to reject the rule at hand.  
 It is, therefore, quite serious to reject LEM for any reason. LEM is central to 
classical mathematics.  Without it, classical mathematics is lost. That is, many of the 
proofs in classical mathematics, even at early stages, rely on LEM.  Reconciling the 
rejection of LEM with the acceptance of classical mathematics would require replacing 
classical logic with some non-classical logic that does not posit LEM as an axiom. 
However, a mathematics that uses that non-classical logic could no longer apply LEM in 
proofs.  Therefore, doing so constructs a new mathematics. However, mathematicians 
have thus far not generated a system worthy of replacing classical mathematics.  The 
competing mathematics systems are not able to maintain the full range of applicability 
that classical mathematics has, not to mention their lesser practicality.   
 Thus, there appears to be an impasse.  Accepting classical mathematics appears to 
require accepting LEM.  Rejecting LEM appears to require rejecting classical 
mathematics.  Neither option is appealing.  Classical mathematics is our most powerful 
and useful system of mathematics. However, there are counterexamples to LEM. The 
problem is that losing classical mathematics comes at too great of a cost.  
 There is a way to resolve this impasse – to accept classical mathematics and reject 
LEM.  The solution requires addressing a fundamental problem in classical logic that is 
the source of counterexamples to LEM and other concerns with the axioms.  
 There are two categories of axioms in classical logic.  First, there are axioms that 
have limited application. False conditions and other axioms like introduction and 
   8 
elimination rules set a restriction – this is an implicit application of relevance.  For 
instance, the conjunction introduction rule is the inference that when any two sentences 
are true a conjunction of those sentences is also true.  Therefore, in cases where there are 
two true sentences, the construction of the conjunction of those sentences follows. These 
rules allow a filtration of when it is acceptable to introduce conjunctions.  Second, there 
are axioms that have no restriction and are intended to apply in all scenarios. There are 
certain implicit restrictions, like the requirement of meaningful sentences, but they are 
not enough – as shown by sentences (2), (3), and (4).  The law of bivalence, the law of 
non-contradiction, and LEM are all examples of axioms from the second-category.  
Classical logic allows the implementation of these second-category axioms at almost any 
time within its formal language.  It is precisely for this reason that there are 
counterexamples for LEM.  
 The second-category axioms need restrictions that can determine when the 
second-category axioms are irrelevant and prevent their application in those cases.  I 
propose integrating the needed relevance restrictions into a new quasi-classical logic. A 
quasi-classical logic is a logic that contains classical logic within it but also has additional 
logical parts.  The application of this quasi-classical logic to classical mathematics will 
allow us to partition out cases where the second-category axioms do not apply.  The 
result is a demarcation of when the practice of classical mathematics can use second-
category axioms of classical logic. With this demarcation of when the classical 
mathematician can help herself to classical logic, there is also a limit set on the 
application of classical mathematics. In this paper, I introduce this new logic and begin 
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the first step of creating it.  I will refer to this new logic as ‘axiomatic relevance logic’ 
(ARL). 
 
AXIOMATIC RELEVANCE LOGIC 
 ARL replaces second-category axioms of classical logic with new axioms.  These 
new axioms simply have the second-category axioms of classical logic as a disjunct in a 
disjunction where the other disjunct is the irrelevance of the second-category axiom of 
classical logic. Consequently, falsifying the irrelevance disjunct would yield the second-
category axioms of classical logic as a formula or theorem. A case-by-case elimination of 
irrelevance would yield the respective axiom as a formula for a particular domain.  An 
execution of these derivations will demarcate the cases and domains in which the 
classical mathematician can use classical logic.  ARL will be able to partition 
philosophically problematic cases as irrelevant, and demarcate appropriate cases that 
constitute the range of application for classical mathematics.  Conveniently, ARL would 
also leave the practice of classical mathematics mostly, if not completely, unaltered.   
 The early stages of creating ARL concentrate on accepting new axioms for the 
system and the theoretical notion of relevance ARL uses.   In the remainder of this 
section, I will briefly discuss proposing new axioms, present/explain the concept of 
relevance used by ARL, and introduce an axiom of ARL that can be used to show that 
LEM is a theorem in the cases that make up the realm of classical mathematics.  The 
introduction of the new axiom is the first step in creating ARL, and it will include a 
detailed demonstration of the role of relevance. 
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 Proposing a new axiom is not unheard of.  Historically there have been new 
axioms proposed and accepted.  However, there is warrant to accept a new axiom only 
when the axiom has sufficient justification.  Penelope Maddy, in her article “Believing 
the Axioms”, provides a general framework for justifying axioms. Axioms have intrinsic 
support when they are “obvious, self-evident” (Maddy, “Believing the Axioms. I” 482).  
Axioms have extrinsic support when the consequences of their application are 
pragmatically significant (Ibid.).  An axiom can be pragmatically significant by allowing 
mathematicians and logicians to find new ways to derive long-standing theorems, solve 
new problems, and explain logic or mathematics.  
 Perhaps the most well-known case of the explicit acceptance of an axiom is the 
axiom of choice. The axiom of choice states that if there are infinitely many non-empty 
sets, then an algorithmic selection of one element from each set can create a new set.  The 
intrinsic and extrinsic justifications for this axiom are strong (Maddy, “Believing the 
Axioms. I” 487).  It has intrinsic support due to its self-evidence.  The axiom of choice is 
simply obvious. It makes sense that the collection of one element from each set can 
constitute a new set.  It has extrinsic support due to the consequences of the axiom.   The 
proofs for many important theorems depend on the axiom of choice.  In fact, the axiom is 
indispensable for a number of areas in mathematics, including abstract algebra and the 
logic of mathematics (Maddy, “Believing the Axioms. I” 488).  
 The axiom of choice also has bizarre consequences. When one combines it with  
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, one can derive the Banach-Tarksi paradox.  The paradox 
states that when a sphere gets cut into at least five pieces, then there is a way to 
reassemble the five pieces into two spheres that are each equal in volume to the original 
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sphere.  The doubling of volume is an absurd consequence of the axiom of choice.  
However, support for the axiom of choice was so strong that mathematicians still 
accepted it.  
 The term ‘relevance’ is multi-faceted, in that it has many different meanings. 
Consequently, there are potentially many concepts of relevance.  ARL is a form of 
relevance logic.  Therefore, it seems natural to consider the concepts of relevance that 
other relevance logics have.  However, other relevance logics are concerned with 
maintaining relevance at each step of a proof. It is within the deductive process 
(derivations) that these relevance logics apply the concept of relevance.  ARL, on the 
other hand, is concerned with determining when the second-category axioms of classical 
logic are relevant.  The relevance status of an axiom is an input into the deductive 
apparatus. That means that the relevance status of an instance of a second-category axiom 
of classical logic is not the conclusion of a proof; rather, it is a premise. Due to the 
radically different role of relevance in ARL, the concepts of relevance that relevance 
logics use are too narrow and irregular.  ARL uses ‘relevance’ in its ordinary sense.  The 
ordinary notion of relevance has broad application, precision, flexibility, is able to filter 
out counterexamples, and the accuracy of its use in individual scenarios is subject to 
deliberation.  Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson propose a theoretical concept of relevance 
in linguistics and cognitive science that has these features. I will use Sperber and 
Wilson’s concept of relevance for ARL.  
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 Contextual effect is the defining feature – the necessary and sufficient conditions 
– of Sperber and Wilson’s concept of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, Relevance 122).1  
Contextual effect is a particular kind of interaction between new and old information.  In 
a given case, old information constitutes the context.  Introducing new information into 
that context has contextual effect if it increases justification for already known 
information, falsifies information, or implicates new information.    
 If a given assumption has contextual effect in a given context, then it is relevant in 
that context.  If a given assumption does not have contextual effect in a given context, 
then it is irrelevant in that context.  
 Sperber and Wilson, in Relevance Communication & Cognition, present three 
ways the introduction of an assumption into a context can fail to produce contextual 
effect.  In the first, the assumption is new information but unrelated to the information in 
the context. In the second, the assumption is identical to information already in the 
context, so the introduction of the assumption into the context does not strengthen any 
old information. In the third, the assumption is inconsistent with information in the 
context and is not strong enough to warrant rejection or falsification of the information in 
the context that brings about the inconsistency. 
 Sperber and Wilson also propose an additional fourth way that an assumption can 
fail to obtain contextual effect.  There is a distinction between cases in which an 
assumption seems to produce contextual effect and cases in which an assumption 
genuinely produces contextual effect.  If processing an assumption in a context produces 
a false or useless conclusion/implication, then it fails to have positive contextual effect.  
                                                        
1
 Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson use ‘cognitive effect’ interchangeably with ‘contextual 
effect’.  This paper uses the latter term in order to preserve consistency.  
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This can occur if one uses a false assumption.
2
  If processing an assumption in a context 
yields a true conclusion or implication, then it succeeds in having positive contextual 
effect.  Only positive contextual effect qualifies as contextual effect (Sperber & Wilson, 
“Relevance Theory” 251-252).3  As an example of an assumption that fails to produce 
positive contextual effect, imagine the following context.  In my room, where I am 
writing this paper, there is a table.  On this table, there is a transparent plastic bottle.  In 
this plastic bottle, there are six fluid ounces of a clear, colorless liquid. All of this 
information constitutes a particular context. The introduction of the assumption that the 
liquid in the plastic bottle is Iordanov Vodka produces a number of conclusions.  Some of 
these conclusions are: (1) there is alcohol in the plastic bottle, (2) there are six ounces of 
vodka in the plastic bottle,  (3) the liquid in the plastic bottle is very expensive, and (4) 
the liquid in the plastic bottle has a sweet aftertaste.  At first, the assumption appears to 
have contextual effect, because it is able to produce new conclusions.  The problem is 
that the liquid in the plastic bottle is actually water.  Consequently, conclusions (1) 
through (4) are false.  As a result, the contextual effect is not positive. Since only positive 
contextual effect counts as contextual effect, the assumption has no contextual effect.  
 Assumptions that produce positive contextual effect in a given context are 
relevant in that context. Relevance comes in degrees. Some assumptions are very relevant 
in a given context and some assumptions are hardly relevant in a given context.  Sperber 
                                                        
2 A conclusion is useless in that it is not worth having.  For instance, if an output is not 
enlightening information by virtue of lacking a truth-value, then it is useless.  
3
 This paper categorizes the lack of positive contextual effect as a fourth way in which 
contextual effect can fail to obtain, since Sperber and Wilson only implicitly discuss it 
when listing the categories in Relevance Communication & Cognition. There is, however, 
an explicit discussion of positive contextual effect in “Relevance Theory”; however, the 
article does not include a categorization of the different ways that contextual effect can 
fail to obtain. 
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and Wilson use the productivity and processing effort of an assumption to determine its 
degree of relevance.  An assumption operates as an input into a context.  The contextual 
effect operates as the output from introducing the assumption into the context.  The 
amount of contextual effect/output produced is the productivity of the assumption/input. 
The number of assumptions/inputs needed to produce the contextual effect is the 
processing effort. Therefore, output per input or contextual effect per assumption 
amounts to the degree of relevance (Sperber & Wilson, Relevance Communication & 
Cognition 125). The value of the quotient relates directly to the degree of relevance.  
 When determining an assumption’s degree of relevance, Sperber and Wilson 
propose comparative and quantitative assessments.  A comparative analysis of relevance 
compares the contextual effect and processing effort of two or more assumptions.   
Assumptions with more contextual effect and less processing effort overall are more 
relevant than assumptions with less contextual effect and more processing effort overall.  
A quantitative analysis of relevance would measure contextual effect and processing 
effort. The measurements would generate a value. An analysis of the value’s place on a 
standard spectrum of potential values would determine the degree of relevance.
4
   
 Relevance in ARL filters out cases where axioms of classical logic are 
inapplicable.  The counterexamples for LEM listed earlier are examples of cases where 
                                                        
4
 Sperber and Wilson have their reservations about a quantitative analysis of relevance.   
Quantifying processing effort requires a reduction of mental processing to elementary 
cognitive operations or some alternative way to track mental effort.  These elementary 
operations and other ways to track mental effort are, thus far, unknown to cognitive 
scientists.  In addition, understanding of contextual effect, Sperber & Wilson believe, 
requires non-quantitative confirmation values.  Counting or tracking contextual 
implication may be alternatives, but either way, cognitive science is currently unable to 
give an absolute account of contextual effect.  Simply put, a quantitative analysis of 
relevance hits a pragmatic wall.   
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LEM is inapplicable.  The goal of the concept of relevance is to evaluate problematic 
cases as involving irrelevance.  We can use the counterexamples for LEM as a test for the 
appropriateness of Sperber and Wilson’s concept of relevance for ARL. 
 
(1) Either an A musical note is green or it is not the case that an A musical note is 
green. 
 
In sentence (1), the assumption/input is that an A musical note is green or it is not the 
case than an A musical note is green.  The context is the information about an A musical 
note, like its pitch, ability to have volume, particular location, and so on.  The 
information that makes up the context is a little vague, for instance, the note having a 
particular location (but not specifying it).  This is a result of sentence (1) being somewhat 
abstract.  The input is unrelated to the information in the context in virtue of the 
attribution of a color to a sound being a category mistake. The input simply cannot 
interact with the context. Consequently, the feature of being green or not being green 
cannot produce contextual effect in the context. The input not being able to produce 
contextual effect means that the input is irrelevant in the given context. 
 The result is that Sperber and Wilson’s concept of relevance provides an 
alternative way to dismiss sentences that the allies of LEM dismiss.  However, Sperber 
and Wilson’s concept of relevance can also dismiss other cases that are problematic for 
LEM, like sentences (2), (3) and (4).  In fact, Sperber and Wilson’s concept of relevance 
is the only tool/standard that ARL needs in order to filter out problematic cases.  
 Consider  
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(2) Either the purpose of human life is to be happy or it is not the case that the 
purpose of human life is to be happy. 
 
In sentence (2), the assumption/input is the purpose of human life is to be happy or it is 
not the case that the purpose of human life is to be happy. The assumption, however, 
relies on human life having a purpose.  According to the stipulations mentioned with the 
initial analysis of sentence (2), the sentence relies on a false presupposition. However, the 
presupposition being true is a requirement for an acceptable assertion of the assumption.  
Since the assertion of the assumption is not acceptable, it cannot act as an input into any 
context.  Without any input, there cannot be an output, no matter what the context is (in 
this case, the features of human life comprise the context).  The result is that the 
assumption fails to produce contextual effect and, accordingly, the assumption is 
irrelevant.
5
 
 Now consider 
 
(3) Either the largest natural number is even or it is not the case that the largest 
natural number is even. 
 
In sentence (3), the assumption/input is that the largest natural number is even or it is not 
the case that the largest natural number is even.  The assumption, like the assumption for 
                                                        
5
 The context that sentence (2) selects does not matter because without an input there 
cannot be contextual effect in any context.   Nevertheless, for clarity, the context that 
sentence (2) selects is human life and all of the related information.    
   17 
sentence (2), relies on a false presupposition.  By relying on a false presupposition, the 
assumption is not able to interact with the information in the context (the nature of the 
natural numbers) and thus fails to produce any output. Consequently, the assumption 
cannot produce contextual effect and is irrelevant.  
 Finally, consider 
 
(4) Either there will be a sea battle tomorrow or it is not the case that there will be 
a sea battle tomorrow. 
 
In sentence (4), the assumption is that there will be a sea battle tomorrow or it is not the 
case that there will be a sea battle tomorrow.   This assumption lacks a truth-value, 
however, it can still be an input into the context.  The context is the time-period of 
tomorrow and other related information.  The following output follows: there will be 
violence tomorrow.   This output, however, also lacks a truth-value.  By lacking a truth-
value, the output is not worthwhile or a significant conclusion.  Therefore, sentence (4) 
fails to produce positive contextual effect and involves irrelevance. 
 The ability of Sperber and Wilson’s concept of relevance to explain and rule out 
the counterexamples is evidence of its appropriateness for this project.  In ARL, 
relevance is all or nothing. Assumptions with low degrees of relevance (where there is 
little contextual effect) are relevant.  Assumptions with no contextual effect are 
irrelevant.  It is possible for ARL to classify relevant assumption with low yields as 
irrelevant.  However, it is not clear how this would be useful, and it would certainly 
introduce complications.   
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 Irrelevance is a disjunct in some of the axioms of ARL.  Each second-category 
axiom of classical logic potentially has cases that are counterexamples.  In ARL, the 
predicates employed in particular instances of the second-category axioms of classical 
logic either can apply to the objects the instance picks out and their context, or the 
predicates are irrelevant to the objects and their context.
6
  In order to account for the 
relation between the second-category axioms of classical logic and relevance, ARL 
replaces each second category axiom of classical logic with a new axiom.  
 Below is the schema for the first of these new axioms, which I refer to as the ‘law 
of excluded irrelevance middle’ (LEIM). 
 
   ((p v ¬p) v I⌜p⌝)   
 
The schema expresses that the sentence, p, is true or its negation is true, or the sentence 
involves irrelevance.  ‘I⌜p⌝’ is a meta-linguistic predicate.  Its interpretation is that p 
involves irrelevance. More specifically, its interpretation is that p has an assumption and 
selects a context such that the assumption is not able to produce contextual effect in the 
context.
7
 ARL’s domain of discourse, U, also holds the following relation: I⌜ϕ ⌝ ⊆U.  
‘I⌜ϕ⌝’ is the collection of all sentences that involve irrelevance. ‘I⌜ϕ ⌝’ is a subset if U.  
 
                                                        
6
 Pre-theoretic notions of the new axioms of ARL are simply a disjunction where one 
disjunct is a second category axiom of classical logic and the other disjunct is irrelevance.  
7 LEIM can also have the schema ‘((p v ¬p) v ÷p)’, where ‘÷’ is a single place sentential 
operator for irrelevance.  The following relation would hold of ARL’s domain of 
discourse: ÷ϕ ⊆ U. That is, the set of all sentences that involve irrelevance is a subset of 
all the sentences in the domain of discourse. This approach to LEIM, however, 
encroaches on the law bivalence.  
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The following is a simple mathematical example of a derivation of LEM from 
LEIM in the realm of baby addition.  After presenting baby addition, I will show how 
ARL, with LEIM, can demarcate baby addition as within classical logic’s and classical 
mathematics’ range of applicability.   
 The language of the system that will allow us to model baby addition consists of a 
vocabulary and formation rules.   
  
 The vocabulary consists of ‘0’, ‘S’, ‘+’, and ‘=’.   
‘0’ is a constant.  
‘S’ is a successor function, where ‘Sα’ means the successor of α.   
‘+’ is an addition function, where ‘α + β’ means the combination of α and β.  
‘=’ is an identity predicate, where ‘α = β’ means that α is identical to β.   
 The system has the following formation rules.  
‘0’ is a term.  
If α is a term, then Sα is a term.  
If α is a term and β is a term, then Sα+ β is a term.  
Nothing else is a term.   
Closed or ground terms do not have variables. 
If α and β are terms, then α = β is a well-formed formula (wff). 
If σ is a wff, then ¬σ is a wff. 
If σ and θ are wffs, then (σ & θ) is a wff. 
If σ and θ are wffs, then (σ v θ) is a wff. 
If σ and θ are wffs, then (σ → θ) is a wff. 
If σ is a wff, then ∀x(σ) is a wff. 
If σ is a wff, then Ǝy(σ) is a wff. 
 The following are the axioms of baby addition 
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 Axioms Explanation 
1. 0  Sα  0 is not identical to the successor of any term. 
 
2. (Sα = Sβ) → (α = β) If the successor of α is identical to the successor of β, then α 
is identical to β. 
 
3. 0 + α = α 0 plus α is identical to α. 
 
4. α + Sβ = S(α + β) α plus the successor of β is identical to the successor of α 
plus β. 
 
 The logic of baby addition is propositional logic with Leibniz’s law and 
parenthesis reduction.   Parenthesis reduction allows us to remove extraneous parenthesis, 
i.e., we can reformulate ‘S(S0)’ as ‘SS0’ with a single application of parenthesis 
reduction.  Leibniz’s law allows us to replace equivalences, i.e. if α = β and α is the 
successor of 0, then β is the successor of 0 by Leibniz’s law.  
 This system is sufficient to do baby addition.  That is, this system is capable of 
proving all equations of baby addition.  I will use ‘1 + 2 = 3’ as an example.  The 
equation ‘1 + 2 = 3’ translates to ‘S0 + SS0 = SSS0’.  Below is the proof of ‘S0 + SS0 = 
SSS0’. 
 
1. S0 + SS0 = S(S0 + S0) premise (Axiom 4) 
2. S0 + S0 = S(S0 + 0) premise (Axiom 4) 
3. S0 + 0 = S0 premise (Axiom 3) 
4. S0 + S0 = S(S0) 2,3, Leibniz’s law 
5. S0 + S0 = SS0 4, parenthesis reduction 
6. S0 + SS0 = S(SS0) 1,5, Leibniz’s law 
7. S0 + SS0 = SSS0 6, parenthesis reduction 
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 ARL can demarcate baby addition as within the range of application of classical 
logic, and consequently as a part of classical mathematics, by demarcating each element 
of the system that models baby addition as within the range of application of classical 
logic.  A necessary condition for an element to be in the range of application of classical 
logic is for LEM to hold for that element.  That means that ARL must be able to get an 
instance LEM from an instance of LEIM when the content of the instances are about an 
element of the system of baby addition.   
 A proof of a case of LEM would require setting up the entire system of ARL. This 
is not accomplishable within the limits of this paper, because creating ARL in its entirety 
is too large a project.  However, a sample derivation can show how these proofs would 
work.  Below is a sample derivation. 
 The following are the interpretations of the sentences. 
Symbol Interpretation 
 
E R selects an assumption, α, and a context, β, such that α produces contextual 
effect in β.  
 
¬E 
 
It is not the case that R selects an assumption, α, and a context, β, such that α 
produces contextual effect in β. 
 
R 
 
Axiom I is a rule that governs the system of baby addition. 
¬R 
 
It is not the case that axiom I is a rule that governs the system of baby addition. 
I⌜ R⌝ 
 
‘Axiom I is a rule that governs the system of baby addition’ involves 
irrelevance (has an assumption and selects a context such that the assumption 
fails to produce contextual effect in the context). 
 
¬I⌜ R⌝ 
 
It is not the case that ‘Axiom I is a rule that governs the system of baby 
addition’ involves irrelevance (has an assumption and selects a context such 
that the assumption fails to produce contextual effect in the context). 
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 The following is a proof of (R v ¬R) 
 
1. ((R v ¬R) v I⌜R⌝) premise (instance of LEIM) 
2. (¬I⌜ R⌝  ↔ E) premise (definitional truth) 
3. E premise (positive fact) 
4. (E → ¬I⌜R⌝ ) 2, biconditional elimination 
5. ¬I⌜ R⌝ 3, 4, modus ponens 
6. (R v ¬R) 1, 5, disjunctive syllogism 
 
 The first line of the proof is an instance of LEIM.  The second line is a 
definitional truth about Sperber and Wilson’s concept of relevance.  It is not the case that 
the sentence, R, has irrelevance if and only if that sentence selects an assumption, α, and 
a context, β, such that α produces contextual effect in β.   The truth expressed by line two 
simply states that contextual effect and sentences involving relevance always occur 
together or always fail to occur together.
8
  The third line claims that the sentence, R, has 
contextual effect. The assumption that R selects is that axiom I is a rule that governs the 
system of baby addition. The context that R selects is baby addition and other related 
information. This assumption produces the output that any successor of a term is not 
identical to 0.  This is a lot of information.  In fact, an infinite amount of outputs can 
result from this assumption. For instance, S0 is not identical to 0, SS0 is not identical to 
0, and so on ad infinitum. Furthermore, these outputs are true. S0 translates to 1 and SS0 
translates to 2; certainly 1 is not identical to 0 and 2 is not identical to 0.  Since the 
assumption that R selects is able to yield true outputs, the assumption produces 
contextual effect.  The fourth line uses the biconditional elimination rule to derive that if 
                                                        
8
 Failing to have irrelevance is equivalent to succeeding to have relevance.   
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R selects an assumption, α, and a context, β, such that α produces contextual effect in β, 
then it is not the case that R involves irrelevance. The fifth line uses modus ponens to 
detach the consequent of line four, and the sixth line uses the fourth line to eliminate the 
‘I⌜R⌝’ disjunct from line one by applying disjunctive syllogism.  The result is that LEM 
holds for R (‘Axiom 1 is a rule that governs the system of baby addition).   
 A similar derivation for each element of the system of baby addition would show 
that LEM holds for the system of baby addition.  Executing these derivations for each 
relevance axiom of ARL would show that baby addition is within the range of application 
of classical logic and thus a part of classical mathematics.   Cases where the irrelevance 
predicate from an instance of LEIM remains are cases in which LEM does not hold, and 
those cases are, therefore, not within the range of application of classical logic and not a 
part of classical mathematics.   
 
JUSTIFYING THE LAW OF EXCLUDED IRRELEVANCE MIDDLE 
 The adoption of LEIM as an axiom of ARL requires justification.  It is obvious 
that properties and negated properties do not exhaust logic.  There are various cases in 
which properties cannot attach to subjects, sometimes even in imagination.  Irrelevance is 
a means to account for those remaining cases.  More importantly, raw intuition and 
language already suggest that these problematic cases involve irrelevance. It is only 
natural to integrate the instrument of relevance to the second-category axioms of classical 
logic. Unlike LEM, LEIM does not account for those abnormal cases by forcing negation 
on them.  Rather, it admits our fundamental intuitions about them – that they are 
misguided, categorically awry, involve inapplicability of the predicate employed, and 
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yielding irrelevance. The logical structure of LEIM accurately models the apparent 
organization of relevance in the universe, establishing its self-evidence.  
 Extrinsic justification, on the other hand, is difficult to provide this early in the 
project.  The fruitfulness of the axiom, and even the system as a whole, has yet to be 
determined.  If ARL yields LEM and other essential rules in enough sub-domains of 
classical mathematics to generate classical mathematics, then there would be strong 
extrinsic justification. There is, however, considerably weaker extrinsic justification for 
LEIM.  The axiom’s ability to explain counterexamples to LEM demonstrates 
explanatory power. The axiom’s ability to explain cases that the defenders of LEM 
already reject also demonstrates explanatory power. The explanations are also 
remarkably intuitive.  The explanatory power of ARL confirms to some degree the 
appropriateness of integrating Sperber and Wilson’s concept of relevance into a logic.  
 There is also the potential for LEIM to permit a more detailed analysis of logic 
and mathematics.  By partitioning out irrelevant cases, further logical processing of 
irrelevant cases becomes possible. Relevant cases, on the other hand, are reducible from a 
LEIM schema to a LEM schema, where a more traditional analysis is employable.  
Whether this is substantial extrinsic justification is unclear, but even allowing the 
possibility of processing a new category of logical sentences – those involving 
irrelevance – is an advantage.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 The success or failure of this project depends on the acceptability of ARL.   
Without showing that ARL is an acceptable system, there can be no genuine confidence 
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in the correctness of this project.  Thus far, there is only a framework of the system and 
one step in its construction.  The implementation of the framework will determine 
whether it is any good. Successful implementation indicates good theorizing.  
Unsuccessful implementation indicates that the framework is flawed.  After all, even a 
framework that appears workable may have fatal problems.  In the case of ARL, 
complete implementation would be a full attempt at constructing the logic.  In the case of 
this program for vindicating classical mathematics within a non-classical logic, 
implementation would be a full attempt at constructing ARL and the derivations to 
demarcate certain elements within the range of classical logic and classical mathematics. 
This is the true test for the endeavor at hand.  
 There is no denying it; this program is in its infancy.  Thus far, I have essentially 
laid down a general framework so there may be something to implement in the first place.  
An inspection of this framework, I admit, is not enough to determine conclusively that 
the program is feasible.  Certainly, there may be lethal concerns that are currently 
unforeseeable. Nevertheless, laying down the right foundation is essential for success.  
ARL is a logic that captures more of the overall structure of logic, in which an integration 
of relevance creates new rules and new consequences.  There is an admission of 
complexity in order to resolve philosophical problems primarily in classical mathematics, 
but also in classical logic.  This early in the project the concern is whether this maneuver 
makes sense and is feasible.  I argue in its favor – that we need to introduce the 
complexity of relevance into logic in order to resolve certain issues, and doing so is 
acceptable.   This is the topic of concern in this stage, and the construction of the entire 
system should commence after its analysis.  
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  A practical concern for ARL is the requirement for multiple derivations, like the 
sample derivation, to demarcate elements of mathematics as within the range of 
application of classical mathematics.  The sample derivation shows that LEM holds for a 
particular element, which is a necessary condition for that element to be within the range 
of application of classical mathematics, but it is not sufficient.  The sufficient conditions 
for demarcating an element as within the range of application of classical mathematics is 
to show that all second category axioms of classical logic hold for that element.  There 
must be a multitude of derivations, like the sample derivation, for each element. 
Demarcating baby addition within the range of application of classical mathematics 
would require an even greater number of derivations. Doing so is a long and tedious 
process.  However, the demarcation process is not as bad as it may seem.  Demarcating 
an element or system requires executing the derivations once.  Demarcating a particular 
element is not an ongoing process unless the relevance analysis of that element is 
unclear.
9
  Writing the derivations may require a lot of paper, but they are short, simple, 
and a one-time task.  
 There is an infinite regress concern for ARL.  LEIM is acting as mechanism to 
determine when LEM applies.  However, there also needs to be an evaluation of the 
applicability of LEIM.  In order for LEM to be derivable for a given case, LEIM must be 
relevant. The introduction of a new axiom, call it LEIM+, should be able to determine the 
applicability of LEIM. LEIM+ is a disjunction in which one disjunct is LEIM and the 
other disjunct is a meta-meta-linguistic sentence for irrelevance (where the meta-
                                                        
9 The relevance analysis of an element being unclear is particularly likely if threshold for 
relevance is at some degree of relevance rather than the mere production of any 
contextual effect.  Certainly, ARL can handle any adjustment in relevance thresholds.  
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linguistic sentence involves irrelevance – P involving irrelevance involves irrelevance).  
The problem is that LEIM+ also needs to be applicable.  Determining the applicability of 
LEIM+ requires another axiom, call it LEIM++.  LEIM++ is a disjunction in which one 
disjunct is LEIM+ and the other disjunct is a meta-meta-meta-linguistic sentence for 
irrelevance.  However, there needs to be another axiom to determine the applicability of 
LEIM++, call it LEIM+++.  LEIM+++ is a disjunction in which one disjunct is LEIM++ 
and the other disjunct is a meta-meta-meta-meta-linguistic sentence for irrelevance.   The 
regression of relevance axioms continues infinitely. Furthermore, the infinite regress is 
vicious because each relevance axiom relies on the succeeding relevance axiom to 
determine whether it is applicable.  Each relevance axiom relying on the succeeding 
relevance axiom means that there is no way to determine the relevance of any of the 
relevance axioms, because any selection of an axiom as a starting point would require a 
succeeding axiom to determine its applicability.   
 If ARL is a system committed to a vicious infinite regress of relevance axioms, 
then it is unintelligible – this would undermine justification for the adoption of the 
original relevance axiom. Therefore, the original relevance axiom of ARL (LEIM) would 
be unacceptable.  However, the original relevance axioms of ARL are essential to ARL. 
Those are the axioms that allow ARL to be a demarcation tool for classical mathematics.  
Without these axioms, the ARL project fails.  
 However, the line of reasoning that leads to an infinite regress concern is 
problematic.  LEIM is the application of Sperber & Wilson’s concept of relevance for a 
particular case.  The notion of another relevance axiom, LEIM+, is questioning whether 
the use of Sperber and Wilson’s concept of relevance is applicable for a particular case.  
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LEIM+ determines the applicability of Sperber and Wilson’s concept of relevance to a 
particular case by applying Sperber and Wilson’s concept of relevance to Sperber and 
Wilson’s concept of relevance.  The proponent of the infinite regress is trying to discover 
the applicability of relevance – this involves looking at relevance the wrong way.  
Consider the following scenario: A blue pen glued to a red pen.  A regress concern may 
follow.  In order for the glue to connect the blue pen to the red pen something must 
connect the blue pen to the glue and another thing must connect the glue to the red pen.  
However, something would also have to connect the blue pen to the thing that connects 
the blue pen to the glue and so on.  An explanation of a blue pen glued to a red pen 
involves an infinite regress. Therefore, the notion of two things connecting with glue is 
unintelligible.   The problem with this analysis is that it involves confusion about how 
glue works. There is no worry about how the glue connects to the pens; the glue is the 
connecting mechanism itself.  In other words, glue is in the business of connecting, and 
that is it. An infinite regress does not follow.  Similarly, an infinite regress does not 
follow from LEIM.  LEIM tests the applicability of LEM on a case-by-case basis.  There 
is no need to test the applicability of an applicability-testing device with LEIM+, which 
uses the same applicability-testing device as LEIM.
10
  The applicability of LEM is 
already in the business application (questioning the applicability-testing device for its 
acceptability is a different objection).  Therefore, there is not a regress of relevance 
axioms.    
                                                        
10 There is a distinction between testing the applicability of LEIM and questioning 
whether or no LEIM is correct.   Rejecting the application of Sperber & Wilson’s concept 
of relevance does not generate an infinite regress, but simply denies the legitimacy of 
LEIM.  
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 The sample derivation may appear to use a question begging proof strategy for 
deriving a second-category axiom of classical logic. The third line of the sample 
derivation is a premise that states that the assumption selected by R produces contextual 
effect in the context selected by R.   Introducing this information as a premise is 
assuming the conclusion.  The question at hand is whether R involves relevance.  The 
production or lack of production, of contextual effect determines the relevance of a 
sentence.  The third line assumes that R can produce contextual effect and, thereby, 
assumes that R involves relevance (or that it is not the case that R involves irrelevance). 
 In response, I claim that introducing the third line into the proof as a premise is 
not assuming the conclusion.  The explanation of line three shows how the assumption 
selected by R is able to produce contextual effect in the context selected by R – the 
assumption generates new information.  This is a positive fact about the relation that the 
components selected by R have.  The third line is expressing this fact with the symbol 
‘E’.   If a contemplation of the assumption and the context selected by R were to indicate 
that the assumption does not produce contextual effect, then line three would express that 
fact with ‘¬E’.  Accordingly, the proof would show that LEM does not hold for R (or that 
LEM is irrelevant in the case of R).  
 There can also be a proof of E.  However, those who view the sample derivation 
as assuming the conclusion would probably not find the proof of E to be any different. 
However, the premise from the proof of E that would be under question is difficult to 
deny as a premise.  Here is a proof of E.  
 
 The following are the interpretations of the propositions. 
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 The following is a proof of E. 
 
 
1. (O → E) premise  
2. A premise  
3. C premise 
4. ((A & C) → O)  premise 
5. (A & C) 2, 3, conjunction introduction 
6. O 4, 5, modus ponens 
7. E 1, 6, modus ponens 
 
 
 The first line claims that if the analysis of the assumption, α, in context, β, is able 
to generate positive output(s), then R selects an assumption, α, and a context, β, such that 
α produces contextual effect in β.   This is a definitional truth about contextual effect.  
The second line is the assumption that R selects, namely that axiom I is a rule governing 
the system of baby addition.  The third line is the context that R selects, namely, the 
Symbol Interpretation 
 
E R selects an assumption, α, and a context, β, such that α produces contextual 
effect in β.  
 
O 
 
An analysis of the assumption, α, in context, β, is able to generate positive 
output(s).   
 
A 
 
Axiom I is a rule that governs the system of baby addition (the assumption that 
R selects). 
 
C A conjunction of the claims of baby addition and certain related information 
(the context that R selects).  
 
R Axiom I is a rule that governs the system of baby addition. 
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identification of the vocabulary of baby addition and the recursive rules of the system.  
The fourth line claims that if we take the given assumption and the given context, then 
the analysis of that assumption in that context generates positive output(s).   The fifth line 
is the conjunction of line two and three.  The sixth line detaches the consequent of line 
four with line five by using modus ponens.  The seventh line detaches the consequent of 
line one with line six by using modus ponens.  
 Again, there can be a criticism for the proof of E as question begging.  The ability 
of an assumption to produce positive output(s) in a context determines whether the 
sentence selecting that assumption and context has contextual effect.  The fourth line 
assumes that the given assumption produce positive output(s) in the given context. 
However, line four is under question.  There must be a demonstration of the production 
of output(s).  
 The criticism that the proof of E involves question begging breaks down at this 
point. When considering the given assumption in the given context, positive outputs 
arise.
11
 An apriori analysis of the given assumption in the given context shows that there 
is a generation of outputs.  There is no simpler or more fundamental justification for the 
fourth line that does not revert to proofs in syllogistic logic.  The claim in line four is true 
and breaking down ‘E’ into other sentences in propositional logic is not possible. The 
claim being true warrants its use as a premise. Therefore, having line four as a premise in 
the proof does not make the proof assume its conclusion.   
 There can also be a dismissal of LEIM by criticizing the dismissal of sentences 
(2) and (3) by appealing to presupposition failure in sentences. Even if the defenders of 
                                                        
11 See page 22 for examples of outputs that the given assumption generates in the given 
context. 
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LEM are interpreting sentences (2) and (3) in an unintuitive way, their interpretation is 
still viable.  Logic is a blunt tool.  It cannot capture all of the complexities of language 
and reasoning.  The duty of the philosopher is to select and integrate the most essential 
parts of logic during logical investigation.  The remaining features, though useful in 
certain scenarios, are disposable. Certain unintuitive interpretations are permissible in 
order to squeeze certain complexities into a limited logic system.  Let there be an 
unintuitive interpretation of sentences (2) and (3).  A consequence of this view is 
partitioning irrelevance cases or counterexamples as false rather than involving 
irrelevance.  This may not model the full complexity of the nature of logic, but it is 
enough to allow classical logic to operate.  In other words, classical logic is filtering out 
problematic cases by declaring them false.  They may not be immediately distinguishable 
from non-problematic cases that have the truth-value ‘false’, but classical logic is still 
rejecting problematic cases in some way.  The result is that there is no demarcation 
problem. Whenever the classical mathematician goes beyond classical mathematics’ 
range of applicability classical logic will allow her to arbitrarily apply the truth-value 
‘false’ to those problematic claims.  
 It is true that the practice of classical mathematics can handle problematic cases 
by categorizing them as having the truth-value ‘false’.  It is also agreeable that the 
philosopher of logic must attempt to integrate into a system only what is essential.  The 
disagreement arises over the essentialness of relevance.  A consequence of accepting 
unintuitive interpretations of sentences (2) and (3) is the grouping of irrelevant cases 
together with false sentences.  This is not acceptable. The philosopher who does not find 
a claim that involves irrelevance to be essentially distinct from a false claim is confused.  
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It is obvious that involving irrelevance is a different logical status than being false.   If the 
difference between a claim being false and a claim involving irrelevance is minor feature 
of logic, then the disposal of the distinction is tolerable.  However, the distinction appears 
to be a central issue.  Therefore, there should be an integration of relevance into logic. 
 An unintuitive interpretation of counterexamples is also not a genuine resolution 
to the question of demarcation.  Categorizing irrelevant cases as having the truth-value 
‘false’ fails to draw a demarcation line.  ARL, on the other hand, is able to take all of the 
objects that classical logic categorizes as having the truth-value ‘false’ and separate them 
into two categories: those that have false propositional content, and those that involve 
irrelevance.  The latter cases constitute the collection of cases in which classical 
mathematics is not applicable and, therefore, a clear demarcation line arises.  As a result, 
the classical mathematician can use the full force of classical logic in all scenarios within 
the demarcation line.   
 
CONTINUATION OF PROJECT 
 The next phase of this project is to formulate and adopt all of the other new 
axioms of ARL that replace the second-category axioms of classical logic. The procedure 
involves integrating a relevance component into each of the second-category axioms of 
classical logic.  After presenting and adopting all of the new axioms, ARL must undergo 
examination to see if it is actually a properly functioning system.  If ARL survives our 
most thorough inspections for inconsistency, invalidity, unsoundness, and 
incompleteness, then it is acceptable as a system of logic.   
   34 
 Considering the differences between ARL and other traditional logics, I suspect 
that ARL is a logic that can actually work.  However, it is far too early to know this with 
any notable degree of confidence.  Establishing ARL as a logic system would permit its 
use in deriving second-category axioms of classical logic in particular cases. The best 
strategy for deriving the second-category axioms of classical logic would be first to target 
sub-domains that include the most basic proofs of classical mathematics. The next target 
would be the sub-domain for the succeeding level of proofs. This pattern would continue 
until enough sub-domains have the necessary second-category axioms of classical logic 
to allow the practice of classical mathematics without classical logic. Building up 
classical mathematics in this manner would complete the project. However, ARL also 
permits the pursuit of further refinements within classical mathematics. Additional 
investigation would identify realms or cases that ARL could explain away or reorganize.  
The extent of these refinements is also unclear, but it is an interesting potential 
contribution to contemplate.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   35 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Anderson, Alan Ross & Belnap, Nuel D., Jr. Entailment The Logic of Relevance and 
Necessity Volume I. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990. 
 
Anderson, Alan Ross & Belnap, Nuel D., Jr. Entailment The Logic of Relevance and 
Necessity Volume II. Oxford: Princeton University Press, 1992. 
 
Atten, Mark van. "Luitzen Egbertus Jan Brouwer." The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. Internet. Available from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/brouwer/, accessed December  
2013. 
 
Ayer, Alfred Jules. “The a priori.” In Philosophy of mathematics second edition, ed. Paul 
Benacerraf & Hilary Putnam, pages 315-328.  Cambridge, United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
 
Bell, John L. "The Axiom of Choice." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 
Internet. Available from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/axiom-
choice/, accessed March 2014. 
 
Bridges, Douglas and Palmgren, Erik. "Constructive Mathematics." The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Internet. Available from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2013/entries/mathematics-constructive/, 
accessed March 2014. 
 
Brouwer, Luitzen Egbertus Jan. “Consciousness, philosophy and mathematics.” In 
Philosophy of mathematics second edition, ed. Paul Benacerraf & Hilary Putnam, 
pages 90-96. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1983.  
 
Brouwer, Luitzen Egbertus Jan. “Intuitionistic reflections on formalism.” In From Frege 
to Gödel A Source Book in Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, ed. Jean van 
Heijenoort, 490-492. United States: Harvard University Press, 1967. 
 
Brouwer, Luitzen Egbertus Jan. ““On the significance of the principle of excluded middle 
in mathematics, especially in function theory,”“ Addenda and Corigenda,” and 
“Further addenda and corrigenda”.” In From Frege to Gödel A Source Book in 
Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, ed. Jean van Heijenoort, 334-345. United States: 
Harvard University Press, 1967. 
 
Frege, Gottlob. “Sense and Reference.” The Philosophical Review 57, No. 3 (1948): 209-
230. 
 
Frege, Gottlob. “Thought: A Logical Inquiry.” Mind 65, No. 259 (1956): 289-311. 
 
   36 
Gödel, Kurt. “What is Cantor’s continuum problem.” In Philosophy of mathematics 
second edition, ed. Paul Benacerraf & Hilary Putnam, pages 470-485. Cambridge, 
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1983.  
 
Grice, H. Paul. “Logic and Conversation.” Syntax and Semantics 3 (1975): 41-58. 
 
Grünfeld, Joseph. Conceptual Relevance. Amsterdam: B.R. Grüner Publishing Co., 1989. 
 
Heyting, Arend. “Intuitionistic views on the nature of mathematics.” Synthese 27, No. 1-2 
(1974): 79-91. 
 
Horn, Laurence. A Natural History of Negation. United States: CSLI Publications, 2001.  
 
Horn, Laurence. “Metalinguistic Negation and Pragmatic Ambiguity.” Language 61, No. 
1 (1985): 121-174 
 
Iemhoff, Rosalie. "Intuitionism in the Philosophy of Mathematics." The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Internet. Available from 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/intuitionism/, accessed 
December 2013. 
 
Kant, Immanuel. “Critique of Pure Reason.” The Electronic Classic Series. PDF. 
Available from http://www2.hn.psu.edu/faculty/jmanis/kant/critique-pure-
reason6x9.pdf, accessed February 2014. 
 
Keil, Frank & Wilson, Robert. The MIT Encyclopedia of the Cognitive Science. 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1999), 719-720.  
 
Kripke, Saul. “Outline of a Theory of Truth.” The Journal of Philosophy 72, No. 19 
(1975): 690-716 
 
Maddy, Penelope. “Believing the Axioms. I.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 53, No. 2 
(1988): 481-511. 
 
Maddy, Penelope. “Believing the Axioms. II.” Journal of Symbolic Logic 53, No. 3 
(1988): 736-764. 
 
Mares, Edwin. "Relevance Logic." The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Internet. 
Available from http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/logic-relevance/, 
accessed December 2013. 
 
Mares, Edwin. Relevance Logic A Philosophical Interpretation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004. 
 
Peirce, Charles. “The Fixation of Belief.” Popular Science Monthly 12 (November 1877): 
1-15. 
   37 
 
Priest, Graham. An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2001. 
 
Putnam, Hilary. Philosophy of Logic. UK: George Allen & Unwin Ltd, 1972. 
 
Quine, Willard Van Orman. “Two Dogmas of Empiricism.” The Philosophical Review 60 
(1951): 20-43. 
 
Rogers, Andy. “How Might Metalinguistic Negation Work?” Armadillo Research 
Institute. PDF. Available from http://www.armadilloresearch.org/wp-
content/uploads/2009/01/MetalinguisticNegation09.pdf, accessed September 
2014. 
 
Rudolph, Carnap. “Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology.” In Philosophy of mathematics 
second edition, ed. Paul Benacerraf & Hilary Putnam, pages 241-257. Cambridge, 
United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
 
Slater, B.H. “Internal and External Negations.” In Mind 88, No. 352 (1979): 488-591. 
 
Speranza, J.L. & Horn, Laurence. “A brief history of negation.” Journal of Applied Logic 
8, No. 3 (2010): 277-301. 
 
Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre. Meaning and Relevance. New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012. 
 
Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre. Relevance Communication & Cognition Second 
Edition. USA: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1995. 
 
Sperber, Dan & Wilson, Deirdre. “Relevance Theory.” people.bu.edu. Internet. Available 
from 
http://people.bu.edu/bfraser/Relevance%20Theory%20Oriented/Sperber%20&%2
0Wilson%20-%20RT%20Revisited.pdf, accessed September 2014. 
 
Strawson, P.F. “On Referring.” Mind 59, No. 235 (1950): 320-344. 
 
Tharp, Leslie. “Which logic is the right logic.” Synthese 31, No. 1 (1975): 1-21. 
 
Troelstra, Anne. “On the early history of intuitionistic logic.” In Mathematical Logic, ed. 
Petio Petkov, 3-17. New York: Plenum Press, 1990. 
 
Von Wright, G.H. “Truth, Negation, and Contradiction.” Synthese 66, No. 1 (1986): 3-
14. 
 
